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TORT LAW-NEGLIGENCE-NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS-BYSTANDER RECOVERY-The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine has held that a mother who became emotionally distressed
as a result of seeing her infant son gag and choke on foreign mate-
rial contained in baby food asserted a valid cause of action for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress.
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me.
1982).
On November 4, 1978, Judith Culbert purchased a jar of Beech-
Nut turkey and rice baby food for her six month old son, Francis,
at Sampson's Supermarket.1 Later that day, while Mrs. Culbert
was spoon feeding the infant, he suddenly began choking and gag-
ing, and eventually spat up a hard substance.2 Following the inci-
dent, Mrs. Culbert alleged that she became very anxious, tense,
and emotionally upset at the sight of her choking baby.3
Judith Culbert and her husband Patrick, as father and guardian
of Francis Culbert, filed two complaints alleging identical causes
against Sampson's and Beech-Nut.4 Counts I, III, and V of each
complaint alleged pain and suffering on the part of the child based
on the theories of negligence and breach of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.' Counts II,
IV, and VI averred liability for the mother's emotional distress
predicated on the theories advanced in counts I, III, and V.6
Beech-Nut responded to the emotional distress counts and count
VII with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and, in the alternative, filed an an-
swer and affirmative defenses. 7 Beech-Nut also filed a motion to
consolidate the two actions;' Sampson's responded with a motion
1. Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 434 (Me. 1982).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., No. CV79-473, slip op. at 1-2 (Sup.
Ct., Kennebec County, July 8, 1980), vacated and remanded, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
5. Id. The supreme judicial court noted that plaintiff waived her right to challenge the
lower court's order striking the implied warranty counts because she failed to raise the is-
sues in her brief or at oral argument. 444 A.2d at 433 n.1. See Harrington v. Inhabitants of
Garland, 381 A.2d 639 (Me. 1978); MacArthur v. Dead River Co., 312 A.2d 745 (Me. 1973).
6. No. CV79-473, slip op. at 1-2.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 1.
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for summary judgment.'
The motions were consolidated and argued before the Superior
Court, Kennebec County.10 The trial judge held that Judith
Culbert's claims for negligently inflicted emotional distress were
without merit because she failed to allege that she was ever in fear
of harm to herself or otherwise within the "zone of danger."11 The
trial court found this allegation necessary in order to meet Maine's
requirement that the plaintiff be within the "bounds of foresee-
ability."1 2 This, the trial judge submitted, was the interpretation
ascribed to Maine law by a federal district court in D'Ambra v.
United States."3 The judge entered judgment on the defendants'
motions and ordered the cases consolidated on counts 1, 111, V, and
VII."4
The superior court denied Judith Culbert's motion to amend 5
and directed the clerk to enter final judgment on the order.16 On
May 29, 1981, counsel for Judith Culbert filed a notice of appeal
with the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. The plaintiff main-
tained on appeal that the lower court had misconstrued existing
Maine law and further argued that her complaint stated a valid
9. Id. at 2.
10. 444 A.2d at 434.
11. Id.
12. No. CV79-473, slip op. at 3. The trial court's rationale was based on Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970), a non-bystander case in which the
plaintiff claimed emotional distress as a result of having partially consumed a bottle of
Coca-Cola containing an unpackaged prophylactic. In permitting recovery, and announcing
a test based on the proximate causal relationship between a negligent act and a reasonably
foreseeable emotional suffering by a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff, the supreme judicial
court declared that the test must be limited within the "bounds of foreseeability" in order
to prevent meritless claims.
13. 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973), modified on damages, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973), afl'd, 518 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1975). The D'Ambra court
asserted that even though Maine apparently adopted a negligence approach to negligently
inflicted emotional distress in Wallace, it "has not been counted as a jurisdiction which
would apply negligence principles to the recovery of a bystander parent for psychic injuries
suffered by witnessing injury to his child." 354 F. Supp. at 817 n.5.
14. No. CV79-473, slip op. at 4.
15. Id. at 4. The plaintiff had immediately filed a motion to amend her complaint to
include allegations that she was within the "foreseeable zone of risk" by reason that her
presence and participation were necessary to feed the child. Alternatively, the plaintiff had
asked the court to finalize Judge Poulin's order, and thus clear the way for an appeal to the
supreme judicial court on the emotional distress issue. However, on appeal, the supreme
judicial court noted that because it found the complaint sufficient as a matter of law, it was
unnecessary to address the plaintiff's contention that the superior court erred in denying
her motion to amend. 444 A.2d at 434 n.2.
16. No. CV79-473, slip op. at 4.
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cause of action in negligence."7
On April 30, 1982, a unanimous supreme judicial court, address-
ing an issue of first impression in Maine, held that Judith Culbert
had indeed stated a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.'8 Justice Violette, writing for the court, first reviewed the
three basic rules which have been used to determine a tortfeasor's
liability to bystanders: the impact rule," the zone of danger rule, 0
and the foreseeability test.21 Justice Violette noted that Maine had
adopted the impact rule in 1921 in Herrick v. Evening Express
Publishing Co. 22 in which the supreme judicial court held that a
claimant must sustain a contemporaneous physical impact in order
to recover for negligently inflicted emotional harm." Relying on
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Battalla v. State, 4 in
which the court stated that the possibility of fraudulent claims
should not deter courts from providing relief where relief is due,
and Maine's own 1970 decision in Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling
17. 444 A.2d at 434.
18. Id. at 438. The court stated that it considered all well-pleaded material allegations
of the complaint as admitted and accepted as true the uncontroverted facts before the lower
court which granted Sampson's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 434. See Harmon v.
Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1979); National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Smith, 376 A.2d
456 (Me. 1977); Steeves v. Irwin, 233 A.2d 126 (Me. 1967); R. FIELD, V. McKUSICK & L.
WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 56.4 (Supp. 1981).
19. 444 A.2d at 434. See infra text accompanying notes 66-83 for a discussion of the
impact rule. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (no
recovery for passenger frightened by street car conductor's ejection of boisterous passenger
where plaintiff sustained no physical impact); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896) (no recovery for pregnant woman who fainted and later miscarried as a
result of nearly being struck by horse-drawn carriage where there was no physical impact).
20. 444 A.2d at 434. See infra text accompanying notes 84-92 for a discussion of the
zone of danger rule.
21. 444 A.2d at 434. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (recovery
permitted where mother sustained emotional and physical injury as a result of seeing her
minor daughter struck and killed by an automobile). See also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
22. 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921). In Herrick, a newspaper publisher negligently
printed a picture of plaintiff's son in connection with a report of the death of another person
with the same name. Id. at 138, 113 A. at 16.
23. Id. at 140, 113 A. at 17.
24. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961). Battalla was the seminal
American case in which the basic tenets of the impact rule were closely examined and re-
jected. There, the child plaintiff was seated in a ski chairlift but was not strapped in and, as
a result, became hysterical and was injured. The court, in overruling Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) and displacing the impact rule with a simple negli-
gence theory based on the quality and genuineness of proof, reinstated the claim for negli-
gently inflicted mental distress and observed that modern medical science and the courts
and juries are sufficiently sophisticated to recognize fictitious and fraudulent claims. See
supra note 19 for a discussion of Mitchell.
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Plants, Inc.,2 5 in which feigned claims were similarly discussed,
Justice Violette observed that the policy reasons that once sup-
ported the impact rule have since been rejected by the courts.2 In
particular, he cited Wallace and pointed out that one reason why
the court overruled Herrick and rejected the impact test was the
court's belief that medical science had advanced to the point where
it could recognize mental injury without regard to physical
injury.
The court next examined the "zone of danger" rule.28 Noting
that it represents the majority view, the court explained that this
rule defines the negligent defendant's liability in terms of whether
the emotionally distressed claimant was within the zone of danger
created by the tortfeasor's conduct or otherwise threatened with
bodily harm.2 9 The court maintained that unjust and arbitrary re-
sults under this rule prompted the California Supreme Court to
renounce the rule in favor of a foreseeability standard in Dillon v.
Legg.30 In Dillon, a mother and her younger daughter witnessed
the older daughter's death when she was struck by an automobile,
and the mother, unlike the younger daughter who was near her
sister in the street, witnessed the incident from the curb, without
fear for her own personal safety. 1 The California Supreme Court
upheld both parties' claims and ruled that a bystander may re-
cover for negligently inflicted emotional distress provided that the
emotional injury was a "reasonably foreseeable result of the
tortfeasor's conduct. 3 2 In reaching its conclusion, the Dillon court
considered whether the plaintiff was located near the accident,
whether the emotional distress resulted from the plaintiff's having
observed the incident, and whether the victim and the plaintiff
were closely related.3 s The Culbert court next examined a passage
from Dillon in which the California Supreme Court explained that
an evaluation of the three factors will indicate the degree of the
25. 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970). See infra text accompanying notes 36-40.
26. 444 A.2d at 434-36.
27. Id. at 436.
28. Id. at 435. See Comment, Duty, Foreseeability, and the Negligent Infliction of
Mental Distress, 33 ME. L. REV. 303 (1981).
29. 444 A.2d at 435.
30. Id.
31. Id. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 334 (4th ed. 1971) in
which this very situation was used to illustrate the potential for anomalous results under the
zone of danger test.
32. 444 A.2d at 435. See 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
33. 444 A.2d at 435. See 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
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defendant's foreseeability, but that the ultimate imposition of lia-
bility should depend on an analysis of all the circumstances on a
case-by-case basis. Foreseeability, the Dillon court cautioned,
should not depend on whether the defendant could have foreseen
the exact nature of the accident and resulting loss. 4 The Maine
court further noted that Dillon imposed the restriction that the
claimant's emotional distress be manifested by physical
symptoms."
According to Justice Violette, the "bounds of foreseeability" test
which was fashioned two years later by the Maine court in Wallace
resembled the Dillon standard.36 In Wallace, the plaintiff had con-
sumed part of a bottled soft drink when he discovered that it con-
tained an unpackaged prophylactic. Later, after thinking about his
experience, he became emotionally upset and vomitted.37 The Wal-
lace court proposed a new rule, stating that the plaintiff should be
permitted to recover if he establishes by a fair preponderance of
the evidence that he was a foreseeable plaintiff and the emotional
harm he suffered was proximately caused by the defendant's negli-
gent conduct.38 However, Justice Violette characterized the Wal-
lace test as obiter dictum 9 and rejected its binding effect by an-
nouncing that the issue before the court in Culbert was one of first
impression in Maine.40
The court, Justice Violette asserted, was convinced that the fore-
34. 444 A.2d at 435. See 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. The
court explained:
In light of these factors the court will determine whether the accident and harm was
reasonably foreseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the
particular defendant as an individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact acci-
dent and loss; it contemplates that courts, on a case-by-case basis, analyzing all the
circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should
reasonably have foreseen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding
the remote and unexpected.
Id. (emphasis in original).
35. 444 A.2d at 435. The court noted that the Dillon rule has been adopted by several
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (recovery
permitted where ten year old boy suffered emotional distress after seeing his step-
grandmother struck and killed by an automobile); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d
300 (1979) (recovery permitted where mother heard the accident from inside her house and
immediately went to the scene to see her daughter lying seriously injured on the ground);
Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (recovery permitted where mother saw her
daughter struck and killed by an automobile).
36. 444 A.2d at 436. See Wallace, 269 A.2d at 121.
37. 269 A.2d at 118.
38. Id. at 121. See 444 A.2d at 436.
39. 444 A.2d at 436. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
40. 444 A.2d at 436.
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seeability standard articulated and applied in Dillon represented
the best approach to bystander recovery.' While the court con-
ceded that any rule limiting recovery for emotional distress is arbi-
trary to some degree, it criticized the zone of danger test and re-
jected it as being too arbitrary and rigid.'2 That test, the court
submitted, unfairly and unnecessarily denies recovery to reasona-
bly foreseeable plaintiffs who sustain severe and provable emo-
tional distress.'3
The court next addressed five policy arguments which have been
raised by a minority of courts that do not recognize bystander re-
covery.4 In so doing, the court gave particular attention to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Sinn v. Burd.' In Sinn,
the defendant-appellee argued that bystander recovery should not
be permitted because: (1) medical technology has not reached the
point where it can accurately define the causal link between al-
leged psychic injuries and the shock of having witnessed an acci-
dent; (2) recovery would open the doors to fraudulent claims; (3)
the courts would be deluged with bystanders' claims; (4) defen-
dants would incur undue liability on account of the proliferation of
claims; and (5) once permitted, bystander recovery could not be
reasonably confined.' 6
Justice Violette examined the Sinn court's response to the five
arguments, agreeing with the rationale of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court that medical science has reached the degree of so-
phistication necessary to provide sufficiently accurate evidence of




44. Id. See infra note 46.
45. 444 A.2d at 436. See 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). The facts in Sinn were
practically identical to those in Dillon in that the plaintiff mother observed the automobile
death of one daughter from her doorstep while the other daughter watched from a point
within the zone of danger. The Sinn court rejected the zone of danger test in favor of the
Dillon foreseeability standard. Id. at 169-70, 404 A.2d at 685 (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81).
46. 444 A.2d at 436. See 486 Pa. at 158-70, 404 A.2d at 678-85. But cf. Stadler v. Cross,
295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980) (reaffirmed the zone of danger rule on the basis that it is
easily administered by the courts and rejected the foreseeability approach because of fears
of unlimited liability); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419
(1969) (fear of unlimited liability and imposition of a new duty of care on defendants
prompted the court to deny recovery to a mother who did not see the accident which ser-
iouly injured her daughter but came immediately to the scene and saw the child lying on the
ground).
47. 444 A.2d at 436.
Vol. 21:797
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with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's premise that concern over
fraud is historically unjustifiable and a court's fear of being over-
worked is insufficient to deny recovery to a party who has sus-
tained a genuine injury at the hands of another.4 Finally, the
court agreed with the Sinn court's repudiation of the notion that
bystander recovery would unduly burden defendants by imposing a
new duty of care, insisting that defendants would owe the same
duty of care but merely would be required to compensate plaintiffs
for injuries which the medical profession until recently had been
unable to define with any reasonable degree of certainty.49
Recognizing the possibility of unlimited liability, the Culbert
court emphasized that defendants should not be forced to compen-
sate plaintiffs for minor and insignificant emotional disturbances.50
Expressly following the leads of Pennsylvania and Hawaii, the
court held that as a fair response to a legitimate concern, only seri-
ous mental injury should be compensable.51 According to Justice
Violette, the court was confident that by adopting the Dillon fore-
seeability approach, in conjunction with the three factors set out in
that decision, 52 Maine courts could adequately and rationally de-
fine defendants' liability to bystanders.5 3 Justice Violette cau-
tioned, however, that the Dillon factors should not be applied for-
malistically to bar recovery; instead he offered, these factors
should be viewed as guidelines of foreseeability and applied in
light of all the circumstances in each case."
Finally, the court addressed the remaining issue of whether a
claimant must also sustain physical injury or exhibit physical
symptoms in order to recover, noting that several jurisdictions re-
quire such a showing before allowing recovery.55 The Culbert court
48. Id. at 436-37. See Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973) (a generalized
policy concern over fraud and the courts' attempts to keep such opportunities at a minimum
should not deter the courts from providing a remedy where one is due).
49. 444 A.2d at 437.
50. Id. See D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 525 (1975) (the law
should not compensate every minor shock of daily life and thereby "reinforce the neurotic
patterns of our society").
51. 444 A.2d at 437. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (court
imposed the same limitation and defined "serious" emotional distress as that which an ordi-
nary person "normally constituted" would be unable to deal with given the circumstances);
Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (recovery limited to claims of serious emo-
tional distress).
52. 444 A.2d at 437. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35 for a discussion of
Dillon.
53. 444 A.2d at 437.
54. Id.
55. Id. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (re-
1983
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rejected this requirement, which had been adopted by the Wal-
lace56 court, for three reasons: (1) this requirement has the effect
of unnecessarily compensating plaintiffs who experience insignifi-
cant emotional upset but who happen to display physical symp-
toms; (2) the rule arbitrarily precludes meritorious claims by plain-
tiffs who suffer severe emotional distress without experiencing
physical symptoms or sustaining physical injury; and (3) this re-
quirement encourages plaintiffs to exaggerate their pleadings and
testimony.5 The court reiterated its belief that medical science
will prove technologically competent to diagnose cases of serious
emotional distress where the claimant suffers no physical injury or
symptoms.
58
Justice Violette concluded by expressly overruling Wallace to
the extent that it required physical manifestations or injury.59 The
emotional harm suffered by bystanders, the court submitted, will
meet the test of foreseeability when the bystander was present at
the accident scene, observed the accident and ensuing danger to
the victim, and was closely related to the victim. Accordingly, the
court ordered the case remanded to the superior court to allow
Judith Culbert the opportunity to plead her cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress."'
While the courts have traditionally permitted recovery for
psychic injuries as an element of damages to an independent tort,""
they have been reluctant to recognize negligently inflicted emo-
tional distress as a separate tort.3 However, beginning in 1888
with the English decision in Victorian Railways Commissioners v.
Coultas,6 4 in which the Privy Council fashioned the impact rule,
three main rules have evolved for determining liability for negli-
covery limited to cases where plaintiff sustains physical harm); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H.
647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979) (recovery limited to cases where plaintiff suffers physical
symptoms).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
57. 444 A.2d at 437. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (plaintiff permitted recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
distress despite the absence of physical injury, provided that the distress was genuine and
the plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant).
58. 444 A.2d at 437. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. at 158-60, 404 A.2d at 679.
59. 444 A.2d at 438.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 52 (4th ed. 1971). See
also 1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
63. See Comment, supra note 28, at 306.
64. 118881 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C.).
804 Vol. 21:797
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gently inflicted emotional distress: the impact rule, the zone of
danger test, and the foreseeability, or Dillon, test. Of these three
tests, the foreseeability test has clearly emerged as the modern ap-
proach to bystander recovery.65
The impact rule was first announced in Victorian Railways
Commissioners v. Coultas.5 Faced with the claims of two plaintiffs
who were nearly struck by a train as a result of a railroad em-
ployee's negligence, the English court held that there could be no
recovery for fright or mental distress resulting from merely negli-
gent conduct unless the plaintiffs sustained a contemporaneous
physical injury or impact.6 7 Although the impact rule was aban-
doned thirteen years later by the English courts,6 the rule was
promptly endorsed by the courts of New York and Massachusetts
in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway 9 and Spade v. Lynn & Boston
Railroad,70 and subsequently, by a number of leading industrial
states.71 These courts reasoned that the impact requirement would
guarantee that a claimant's emotional injury was genuine,72 and
feared that any other rule would be impossible to administer and
would result in a flood of litigation,7 3 fraudulent claims, 74 and un-
limited liability.7
5
65. See generally Comment, supra note 28, at 314-17.
66. [18881 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C.).
67. See W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 54, at 330-31.
68. See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669 (adopting the zone of danger test).
Dulieu, in turn, was overruled in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (adopting the
foreseeability test).
69. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). In Mitchell, a negligently driven horse-drawn
carriage stopped so close to the plaintiff that she stood between the horses' heads; she
fainted and later miscarried. The court of appeals denied recovery on the basis that the
plaintiff sustained no contemporaneous physical injury, and further held that since there
can be no recovery for the emotional injury, none could be had for its physical conse-
quences. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354.
70. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). In Spade, the plaintiff suffered fright and
mental anxiety as a result of a street car conductor's boisterous attempts to eject an unruly
passenger. The court denied recovery on the basis that the plaintiff sustained no physical
impact. Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89.
71. See, e.g., West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Liebig, 79 11. App. 567 (1898); Brisboise v.
Kansas City Public Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.,
78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
72. See W. PROssER, supra note 62, § 54, at 331.
73. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Ward v.
West Jersey & S.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900).
74. See, e.g., Morse v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361 (1903); Nelson v.
Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896).
75. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Miller v.
Baltimore & O.S.W.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908).
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However, it soon became apparent that the courts were relying
more on the physical consequences of the accident than on the im-
pact requirement as a sufficient guarantee of the genuineness of
the emotional harms.7  When convinced that a claimant had suf-
fered serious emotional distress, the courts went to great lengths to
find "impact," even when the "impact" had nothing to do with the
psychic harm suffered." This dilution of the impact rule, the
proliferation of exceptions such as the negligent transmission of
telegraph cases78 and negligent handling of corpses,7 9 and the gen-
eral reassessment of the policy reasons underlying the rule,80 sig-
naled the decline of the impact rule. Beginning with the 1890
Texas decision in Hill v. Kimball,81 and precipitated by the 1961
New York decision in Battalla v. State,82 the impact rule was dis-
placed in a majority of American jurisdictions" by a new test: the
zone of danger test.
The zone of danger test, which was endorsed by the drafters of
the Second Restatement of Torts,84 permits recovery where the
plaintiff was within the zone of risk of injury created by the defen-
76. See W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 54, at 332.
77. Id. at 331. See also Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232
Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929) (trifling burn); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 73 N.J.L.
405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in the eye); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869
(1930) (inhalation of smoke); Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948) (an
electric shock).
78. See, e.g., Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943)
(plaintiff permitted to recover for mental anguish where the negligent late delivery of a
telegram caused plaintiff to miss his brother's funeral). But see Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Choteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 P. 879 (1911) (no recovery for mental distress resulting from
negligent delay in transmission absent statute permitting the same).
79. See, e.g., Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154
(1933) (recovery permitted for plaintiff's emotional anguish resulting from defendant's neg-
ligent embalming); Hale v. Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S.W. 605 (1891) (wife permitted recovery
for emotional distress caused by the negligence of a railroad company in delaying the trans-
portation of her husband's corpse).
80. See, e.g., Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Bat-
talla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Simone v. Rhode
Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202 (1907).
81. 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
82. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
83. See W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 54, at 332. See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d
100, 143-50 (1959).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965) which adopts the zone of
danger test: "(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily
harm of another which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a
third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to the other." Id.
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dant's negligent conduct."' The court adopted this test for three
basic reasons.8 6 First, the courts reasoned that it was reasonably
foreseeable that a bystander would fear for his own safety if he
were within the zone of risk, and therefore, provide a sufficient
guarantee that his emotional injury was genuine. 7 Second, the im-
pact requirement had been stretched so far that it no longer served
to separate the meritorious claims from the undeserving claims.88
Finally, the zone of danger test was perceived as a standard which
was easy to administer and one which would effectively insulate
defendants from unlimited liability.89
The problem with applying the zone of danger test, however, is
that the test focuses on the bystander's concern for his own safety
and ignores the main, if not sole, cause of the emotional injury: the
bystander's fear of harm or peril to the direct victim of the defen-
dant's negligence.90 Although the zone of danger tended to produce
more reasonable results than the impact rule, and provided a
clearer definition of the scope of a defendant's liability, the test
has been attacked as lacking strong logical supports' and being
hopelessly artificial" as applied in bystander cases.
The artificiality of the zone of danger test was exposed in Cali-
fornia in Dillon v. Legg"s where the trial court dismissed the
mother's claim because she witnessed her infant daughter's death
from a point of safety, and upheld the older daughter's claim be-
cause she was within the zone of danger.94 On appeal, the Califor-
85. See, e.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (mother who
watched as her child was run down by a car was denied recovery on the basis that she was
outside the zone of danger); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (re-
covery similarly denied on same facts).
86. See Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Liability to the By-
stander-Recent Developments, 30 MERCER L. REv. 735, 737-38 (1979).
87. Id. at 737.
88. See W. PRossER, supra note 62, § 54, at 331. See also supra text accompanying
note 76.
89. See Comment, supra note 86, at 737-38.
90. See Dziolonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
91. Id. at 555, 380 N.E.2d at 1300. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 54, at 334.
92. See 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
93. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See supra text accompanying
notes 30-35. Dean Prosser suggested, in response to the zone of danger test, that: "[I1t seems
sufficiently obvious that the shock of a mother at danger or harm to her child may be both a
real and serious injury. All ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against the
negligent defendant." W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 54, at 334.
94. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. The lower courts applied the
zone of danger test which was first adopted by the California Supreme Court in Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
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nia Supreme Court rejected the notion that the older daughter
could be treated differently merely on the basis that she happened
to be a few feet closer to the accident."' Instead, the court adopted
a foreseeability standard with three factors to be used as guidelines
in determining bystander liability: (1) whether plaintiff was near
the accident; (2) whether the emotional injury resulted from the
contemporaneous observation of the accident; and (3) whether the
victim and the plaintiff were closely related. 6 The Dillon court
emphasized that although these three factors will indicate the de-
gree of the defendant's foreseeability, the ultimate imposition of
liability should depend on a case-by-case analysis of all the sur-
rounding circumstances.7
Since 1968, a number of jurisdictions have followed Dillon's lead
and adopted a foreseeability approach to bystander recovery. In
Hughes v. Moore,98 the Virginia Supreme Court permitted recovery
for emotional disturbance and resulting physical injury where the
plaintiff-bystander was able to prove that her physical injury was
the natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by the de-
fendant's negligence. In 1974, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Leong
v. Takasaki,e9 upheld the claim of a ten year old boy who wit-
nessed his stepgrandmother being struck and killed by an automo-
bile. The next year, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the
Dillon test verbatim and upheld the claim of a mother who saw her
infant son run over by a mailtruck, in D'Ambra v. United
States.100 In 1978, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, in Landreth v.
Reed,'01 held that a minor plaintiff stated a valid cause of action
for the psychic injury she sustained as a result of having witnessed
efforts to revive her infant sister after the infant was removed from
a swimming pool at a day nursery. Likewise, the courts of Wash-
ington,' 2 Massachusetts,103 New Hampshire,' °" Pennsylvania, 105
95. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. See also Nolan & Ursin,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS
L.J. 583, 585 (1982).
96. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
97. 68 Cal. 2d at 741-42, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
98. 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
99. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
100. 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
101. 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
102. See Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). In Hunsley, the
plaintiff was sitting in her living room when defendant's vehicle crashed through the walls of
the house and came to rest in plaintiff's utility room. The court, in permitting recovery,
couched the test in ordinary negligence terms, emphasizing the concepts of duty and fore-
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New Jersey 06 and Iowa 07 have permitted bystander recovery for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
According to Justice Violette, Culbert is the first opportunity
that the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has had to examine by-
stander recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.108 Prior to 1970, Maine adhered to the impact rule and de-
nied recovery for emotional harm where no contemporaneous
physical injury was sustained. 09 Then, in 1970, the supreme judi-
cial court discarded the impact rule and recognized negligent in-
fliction of mental distress as an independent tort.1
Maine adopted the impact rule expressly in 1921 in Herrick v.
seeability. The court held that, beyond establishing duty and foreseeability, the emotional
harm suffered must be manifested by objective symptomatology and must be of the kind
which an ordinary person would experience given the circumstances. Id. at 424, 553 P.2d at
1102-03.
103. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978) (valid cause
of action stated where bystander-parent sustains severe emotional injury resulting in sub-
stantial physical harm when parent either witnesses the accident or soon comes on the scene
while the child is still there).
104. See Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979). See supra note 35.
105. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). See supra notes 21, 35, 45
and accompanying text.
106. See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (recovery permitted where
mother watched her seven-year-old son die after he became trapped between an elevator
and wall of the shaft).
107. See Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981). In Barnhill, the plaintiff-son
watched as the vehicle that his mother was driving was struck as she attempted to pass
through an intersection. The court held that in addition to satisfying the Dillon guidelines,
plaintiff must suffer physical manifestations of the mental injury and that an ordinary per-
son in plaintiff's position would have believed that the "direct" victim was threatened with
death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 108.
108. 444 A.2d at 434. Counsel for appellees in Culbert directed the court's attention to
the fact that bystander recovery was first before the court in Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227
(1880). In Wyman, the defendant was blasting on property adjoining plaintiff's property
when the powerful charges caused rocks to be propelled onto the plaintiff's land and house.
As a result, Mrs. Wyman became fearful for her young son's physical safety, as well as her
own. The court held that the plaintiff's mental anxiety for her own safety was not a compen-
sable injury in the absence of physical harm. It further stated that, even if her son had
suffered physical injury, recovery would have been limited to deprivation of the child's ser-
vices since the case did not fall within one of the exceptions to the impact rule. Id. at 227-
31.
Counsel for appellees further stated that the Wyman court did not address the plain-
tiff-mother's bystander claim presumably because the court first found that her claim for
fear of harm to herself was defective under the impact rule. See Brief on Behalf of Appel-
lee's Sampson's and Beech-Nut Corp. at 5, Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444
A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).
109. See Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921).
See infra text accompanying notes 111-114.
110. See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970). See in-
fra text accompanying notes 115-21.
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Evening Express Publishing Co."' In Herrick, the defendant neg-
ligently printed a picture of the plaintiff's son in connection with
the death of another person with the same name." 2 The court held
that in cases where the emotional harm is caused by a defendant's
negligent conduct, the claimant had no cause of action unless he
sustains contemporaneous physical impact.' The Herrick court's
approach was typical of the courts of its era in its reluctance to
recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress as a separate
tort. Generally, the courts regarded such claims as too uncertain
and speculative because there was no basis upon which courts and
juries could determine whether and to what extent mental harm
had been sustained.'
1 4
Herrick and the impact rule stood for almost fifty years in
Maine until overruled in Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants,
Inc.1 5 In Wallace, the plaintiff was drinking from a bottle of Coca-
Cola when a foreign object touched his lips and tongue.' He sum-
moned the store owner who watched as the plaintiff emptied the
remaining contents into a cup, revealing that the object was an un-
packaged prophylactic. '1 7 Only after returning home did the plain-
tiff become physically and emotionally upset over his experience.'18
The Wallace court rejected the impact rule and announced a fore-
seeability test: recovery would be permitted where the claimant
could prove that he was a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff and that
his emotional harm was foreseeably and proximately caused by the
actor's negligence."19 The court limited recovery to cases where the
mental suffering is substantial and manifested by objective symp-
toms,120 and concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that an
object of such a "loathesome nature" would cause nausea and emo-
tional distress to the plaintiff-consumer.1
2 1
Culbert is significant in that the Maine court adopted Dillon
111. 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921). See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
112. Id. at 139, 113 A. at 16.
113. Id. at 140, 113 A. at 17.
114. See Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C.,C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892) (no
recovery for emotional distress and resultant permanent physical disability caused by train
collision where plaintiff sustained no physical impact). See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 62, § 54, at 331.
115. 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970). See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
116. 269 A.2d at 118.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 121.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 121-22.
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without Dillon's physical manifestations requirement. Expressly
following the leads of the Hawaii"' and Pennsylvania 2 3 Supreme
Courts, the Culbert court chose to focus on the qualitative nature
of the emotional harm instead of relying on its physical effects as a
sufficient guarantee of genuineness.12 4 By eliminating this require-
ment, Maine will avoid the problems that eventually prompted the
California Supreme Court to reject the Dillon physical manifesta-
tions requirement in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.12 5 In
Molien the court found that the Dillon physical manifestations re-
quirement is both overinclusive and underinclusivel26 because it
precludes recovery for those deserving claimants who suffer severe
emotional distress with no resultant physical symptoms, and it
compensates those claimants who experience physical symptoms as
a result of insignificant emotional disturbances. 27 As a practical
matter, the Molien court found that such a requirement only
serves to encourage extravagant pleading and distorted
testimony. 2 '
Consequently, since the Culbert court held that only serious
emotional distress is compensable, the implication is that claims of
serious emotional distress will always survive the pleading stage.12 9
By focusing on the qualitative nature or seriousness of the injury,
the court has made an important policy determination that the
fact-finders are best situated to determine whether and to what
extent the defendant's conduct caused the emotional injury al-
leged. In most cases, the proffered medical testimony will, to a
great extent, determine whether serious emotional harm has been
sustained. The court's resort to seriousness, however, becomes very
significant where the medical testimony is inconclusive; in such in-
stances, the determination of seriousness appropriately lies within
the human experience of the fact-finder.
122. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (recovery limited to claims
of "serious" emotional distress where "serious" emotional distress is defined as that which
an ordinary person "normally constituted" would be unable to deal with given the
circumstances).
123. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (adopting the same standard ex-
pressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Leong).
124. .444 A.2d at 437.
125. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
126. Id. at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
127. Id., 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
128. Id., 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The Molien court went so far as to say
that the screening of claims on the basis of seriousness at the pleadings stage is a usurpation
of the jury's function. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
129. 444 A.2d at 438.
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Another interesting aspect of the Culbert decison is the supreme
judicial court's treatment of Wallace. Although Wallace was not a
bystander case, arguably, the Wallace foreseeability test was
couched in language broad enough to cover the situation in
Culbert. However, the court dismissed the Wallace test as obiter
dictum130 and proceeded to address the issue as one of first impres-
sion. The Culbert court probably avoided Wallace for one of
two reasons: either the court believed that the Wallace court could
have permitted recovery under the then current impact rule, and,
therefore, the creation of the foreseeability test was unnecessary,' 3 '
or the court recognized that the bystander issue in Culbert was
clearly distinguishable from the non-bystander situation in
Wallace, and, instead of expressly distinguishing Wallace, it la-
beled the test "obiter dictum" in order to avoid applying the
test. 
32
One question that remains after Culbert is how close to the acci-
dent scene the bystander must be in order to recover. A few courts
have held that the bystander's presence at the scene is unnecessary
provided the bystander arrives shortly after the injury-producing
event. 33 Closely related to the proximity issue is whether visual
130. 444 A.2d at 436. Obiter dictum is defined as:
Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark
made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, 'by the way,'
that is, incidentially or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced
by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 967 (5th ed. 1979).
131. See 444 A.2d at 436. Since the prophylactic came in contact with the plaintiff's
lips and tongue, the situation fell neatly within the existing impact rule.
132. In any event, the Culbert court's treatment of Wallace is certain to create confu-
sion as to the viability of Wallace as precedent in future cases. Taken literally, the Culbert
court's characterization of the Wallace test as obiter dictum renders Wallace of little or no
precedential value. If, on the other hand, Culbert merely overrules Wallace to the extent
that Wallace requires physical manifestations of the emotional harm, Wallace may be con-
trolling in future nonbystander cases; it remains to be determined whether the supreme
judicial court will choose to limit Wallace on its facts and apply it only in food and beverage
cases. See Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California Expands Liability
for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 291 (1981), wherein the au-
thor suggests that the impure food and beverage cases have received special treatment by
the courts because the presence of noxious foreign objects provides a guarantee that the
claim is genuine, and because consumers must rely on and confide in the manufacturers of
these products. Id. at 305-07.
133. See, e.g., Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969)
(recovery permitted where mother appeared at the scene within moments after a gunpower
explosion injured her son); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979) (recovery
permitted where parents arrived at the accident scene moments later and saw daughter ly-
ing seriously injured on the ground after having heard the accident from inside the house);
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perception of the event is necessary in order to meet the "sensory
and contemporaneous observance" guideline of Dillon.13 4 Califor-
nia and Pennsylvania have devised the percipient witness concept
whereby the contemporaneous observance factor is satisfied when
the bystander perceives the event by other than visual means. 138
Another issue is how suddenly must the injury-producing event oc-
cur. California appears to require a sudden and brief event and has
rejected the claim of a mother who witfnessed the slow and progres-
sive death of her child.'36 One final question is what degree of rela-
tion between the victim and the bystander is necessary to meet the
close relations factor of Dillon.13 7 The courts have generally agreed
that the requirement is satisfied as between immediate family
members.' " Other courts have permitted bystander recovery where
the victim was a stepgrandmother, 139 a foster child," 0 an unborn
Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (recovery permitted where mother arrived
shortly after the accident and watched her seven-year-old son die after he had become
trapped between the elevator and wall of elevator shaft). But see Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal.
App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977). In Arauz, the plaintiff-mother arrived at the acci-
dent scene five minutes after her son was struck by defendant's automobile. While the court
stated that visual perception of the injury-producing event is not necessary, it asserted that
some type of contemporaneous observation is a prerequisite to bystander recovery.
134. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rtpr. 72 (1968).
135. See Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977). In
Krouse, the plaintiff-husband was sitting in the driver's seat facing forward and his wife was
loading groceries into the back of their automobile when defendant's vehicle struck them
from the rear. Even though the husband did not see the impact or the immediate result of
the impact, the court treated the husband as a "percipient witness" since he knew where his
wife was positioned and saw the defendant's vehicle moving at high speed in that direction
immediately before the accident. See also Bliss v. Allentown Public Library, 497 F. Supp.
487 (E.D.Pa. 1980) (the court, applying Pennsylvania law, held that a mother who heard a
statue fall on her child and immediately turned to see the child lying on the floor, was
entitled to recover). But see Hoffner v. Hodge, 47 Pa. Commw. 277, 407 A.2d 940 (1979)
(identical twin sister stated no cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress
where she did not view the negligently performed operation which injured the other twin).
Cf. Burke v. Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (identical twin
sister of decedent who died in airplane crash did not satisfy the sensory and contemporane-
ous requirement notwithstanding that twin sister alleged that she experienced a burning
sensation in her chest and sensations of being "split" at the precise time of the crash).
136. See Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr.
883 (1973). Accord: Sims' Crane Service, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.
Ga. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law, the court held that the plaintiff was not permitted to
amend her complaint to allege emotional distress as a result of her husband's having devel-
oped asbestosis).
137. See 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
138. See generally Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 486, 487-92 (1979).
139. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). See supra note 35.
140. See Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720
(1976).
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child," '4 or a close personal friend;142 one court has denied recovery
where the victim was a "de facto spouse.
''4
3
Culbert should prove to be a workable standard in Maine pro-
vided that courts apply the three factors of Dillon144 as guidelines
of foreseeability. As the Dillon court emphasized, this requires that
the courts analyze all of the factual circumstances on a case-by-
case basis, applying the factors as guidelines and not as strict re-
quirements that the plaintiff must meet literally or risk the loss of
his claim. The supreme judicial court has taken a commendable
approach by limiting recovery on the basis of the seriousness of the
emotional injury, instead of resorting to the artificial physical man-
ifestations requirement. By adopting this approach, the court has
properly reserved to the medical profession and finders of fact the
responsibility of separating the undeserving claims from the de-
serving ones. Ultimately, however, the development of Maine's new
foreseeability approach depends on the fact finder, for it is the fact
finder's resort to human experience and common sense that will
define the foreseeable and exclude the remote and unexpected.
Samuel F. Reynolds Jr.
141. See Austin v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1979). See also Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 97 Misc. 2d 907, 412 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1978).
142. See Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (close personal relation-
ship by consanguinity or otherwise).
143. See Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980) (no recovery
for plaintiff who witnessed the death of the man that she lived with for three years).
144. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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